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The EU and the international sanctions against
Iran: European and Iranian foreign and security
policy interests, and a changing Middle East
Peter Seeberg1
ABSTRACT In July 2015 an agreement on the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
regarding Iran’s nuclear program was announced between Iran and the permanent members
of the UNSC, Germany and the EU. The Iranian decision to comply with the results of the
negotiations attracted much focus, both at the policy level and in scholarly debates. However,
the foreign and security policy interests and possibilities of Iran in the MENA region have not
been discussed very intensively, nor has there been much attention paid to how the inter-
national actors and in particular the EU were able to inﬂuence the Iranian policies and
decisions. This article seeks to take up this challenge: ﬁrstly by analyzing to what degree the
sanctions inﬂuenced the Iranian decisions on the nuclear issue; and secondly, by discussing
how the sanctions regime affected the relations between Iran and the international actors,
with a speciﬁc focus on the EU and the ability of Iran to pursue its foreign policy interests in
the Levant and the Gulf. This article is published as part of a collection on analysing security
complexes in a changing Middle East.
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Introduction
This article analyses the speciﬁc role of the EU in connectionwith the negotiations with and sanctions against theIslamic Republic of Iran in the context of a changing
Middle East since the Arab uprisings, where the problematic
developments in several Arab states (Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Yemen…) resulted in a more fragile and destabilized political
situation in the Middle East region. The role of the EU is analysed
in the context of how international actors sought to inﬂuence Iran
in an attempt to affect the security environment of which Iran is a
part and thereby the Iranian foreign and security policy. To put
pressure on the regime in Teheran a comprehensive sanctions
regime was imposed on Iran and played a role in deﬁning the
foreign and security policy conditions for the Iranian state in two
different geostrategic contexts.
First, Iran is pursuing its interests in the unstable Levant and is,
in connection with that, affected by the ongoing war in Syria
and the signiﬁcant position of new non-state actors, not least
the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. Secondly, Iran plays a signiﬁcant
role in the Gulf, where it takes part in a triangular rivalry
with Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, in
particular Saudi Arabia. Thus, focusing on Iran in the Middle
East in the context of international security structures involves
(at least) two security subcomplexes, the Levant and the Gulf
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 7). In the Levant, Iran has traditionally
been maintaining a signiﬁcant position via its alliance with
Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. This alliance, however, is not as
strong as it used to be. The weakening of Iran’s traditional ally,
Syria, as a result of the Syrian civil war, represents a setback for
Teheran, as shown by Khatib (2015). Added to that the
Hezbollah, taking part in the war in Syria in support of the
regime in Damascus, experiences a relative weakening as a result
of the emergence of IS on the political and military scene in (Iraq
and) Syria. Finally Hamas has broken its close relationship with
the Syrian regime.
Still, Iran plays an important role as an external actor in the
eastern Mediterranean. In the Gulf the structure of the regional
balance of power drives competition between Iran and its Arab
neighbours, in particular the GCC countries, and in connection
with that, the nuclear issue frequently has been emphasized by
the GCC as a source of instability. Iran was subject to severe
international sanctions; for years the UN, the United States and
the EU contributed to a comprehensive sanctions regime aimed at
inﬂuencing the Islamic Republic, ﬁrst of all with the ambition of
being able to control the controversial Iranian nuclear program
(Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera 2015; Katzman, 2015).1
It is the idea of this article to analyse foreign and security policy
challenges related to European—Iranian relations with a speciﬁc
focus on how and to what degree the sanctions have played a role
in connection with the policies of Iran in the two security
subcomplexes in the Levant and the Gulf. The article argues that
there is a complex and ambiguous interrelatedness between the
sanctions imposed on Iran and the development over recent years
of the Levant and Gulf security subsystems and thereby in a
broader Middle Eastern perspective. The political realities for Iran
might, as claimed by Thomas Juneau, to some degree live up to
the label “strategic loneliness”, (Juneau, 2014) but when the
different aspects related to the sanctions are included in the
analysis, the perspective changes and makes it clear that the
recent political conditions for the Islamic Republic are somewhat
ambiguous and furthermore seem to indicate that the efﬁciency of
the sanctions to some degree can be questioned.
Internally in Iran there is hardly any doubt that the right to
develop nuclear power facilities enjoys widespread support
among most Iranians and that the same goes for the “ofﬁcial”
criticism of the imposed sanctions. And initially Iran seemed to
be able, by diversifying its international linkages, to some extent
to counteract the effect of the international sanctions, thus
making it easier for Iran to pursue its foreign policy interests.
Added to that, one of the largest sanctions-sending entities, the
EU, experienced a lack of consensus among its member states
concerning the sanctions (Alcaro and Tabrizi, 2014; Onderco,
2015). There were several examples of this, and they indicate a
lack of coherence attached to the EU as a foreign-policy actor.
The relatively isolated political situation for Iran, the effect
(despite counteracting manoeuvres) of the sanctions, and the
deteriorating strength of its alliances in the Arab region altogether
point at a decline of Iranian inﬂuence in the two heterogeneous
security subcomplexes, or to speak with Buzan et al., miniature
anarchies analysed in this article (Buzan et al., 1998). It is the
ambition in the ﬁrst place to analyse how and to what degree
the sanctions against Iran were able to inﬂuence the Iranian
decisions on the nuclear issue. Second, it is the intention to
discuss how the imposing of the sanctions regime affected the
speciﬁc European—Iranian foreign and security policy relations.
And third, the article will examine if and in what ways the
sanctions have played a role in inﬂuencing Iranian ability to
pursue its policies in the two mentioned regional subcomplexes
mentioned above: the Levant and the Gulf.
Analytical framework: regional security complexes,
recombinant authoritarianism and the effect of sanctions
The conceptual understanding of a regional security complex
within the context of the Copenhagen School is associated with
this deﬁnition: “a set of units whose major processes of
securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that
their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved
apart from one another”. (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 44) This
deﬁnition emphasizes the signiﬁcance of the state as actor and the
notion of securitization/desecuritization in state relations.
Furthermore, the military-political focus of the deﬁnition under-
lines that the securitization and desecuritization processes express
themselves in regional clusters—in the context of the Gulf what
Payam Mohseni calls “the Iran-Saudi cold war” (Mohseni et al.,
2015). The permanent tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia
(and the other GCC states) is a good example of this, and it is
obvious that the rivalry unfolds itself on many different stages,
where some deal with internal affairs in a speciﬁc state (as in the
case of Iranian support for Shia Muslim interests in Bahrain),
some are regional (regarding Iraq, where the common Iran—
Saudi interest in a weak Iraq interferes with the Iranian interest in
inﬂuencing the Shia-majority in Iraq), and some are extra-
regional (as in Afghanistan, where Saudi Arabia and Iran have
supported different factions in the internal wars there). The
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, aggravating sectarianism
across the Middle East region, is also emphasized in the Global
Strategy document of 30 June 2015, launched by the EU High
Representative Federica Mogherini: “The European Union in a
changing global environment”, where the challenges for the EU
external instruments are underlined (Mogherini, 2015).
The Gulf Wars have, as implied by Buzan and Wæver, led to a
change in the status of the GCC states, where they have to some
degree reached a position like being protectorates of the West and
in particular the US (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 205). Thus, the
relative weakening of Iraq as a result of the Western intervention
has in principle strengthened the position of the GCC states
vis-à-vis Iran. On the other hand, Iran (certainly without being an
ally of the US) has also gained from the weakening of Iraq. This
paradox emphasizes the complexity and dynamic character of the
Gulf regional security subcomplex. An important discussion
within research deals with if Iran to some degree has been able to
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counteract the effect of the international sanctions by diversifying
its external relations (Kozhanov, 2011).
In an analysis of Iran and Syria, Steven Heydemann and
Reinoud Leenders have discussed this element in connection with
an attempt to elaborate the paradigm of authoritarian resilience,
where they suggest focusing on the adaptive capacities of regimes
being faced with changing political and/or economic conditions.
They have developed the notion of recombinant authoritarianism,
being deﬁned as “systems of rule that possess the capacity to
reorder and reconﬁgure instruments and strategies of governance,
to reshape and recombine existing institutional, discursive, and
regulatory arrangements to create recognizable but nonetheless
distinctive solutions to shifting conﬁgurations of challenges”.
(Heydemann and Leenders, 2011: 7; Heydemann and Leenders,
2013) If the pressure ﬁrst of all from the West is seen as an
example of this mechanism, then the ability to ﬁll the vacuum
(lack of foreign trade) by looking elsewhere (to Russia, China and
so on) represents an expression of recombinant authoritarianism
(Ehteshami et al., 2013).
The theoretical literature, discussing if, when, and why
sanctions work, has a relatively long history and reveals
signiﬁcant disagreements regarding to what degree sanctions
are considered efﬁcient (Drezner, 2000; Chesterman and
Pouligny, 2003). The classical debate focuses mostly on economic
sanctions and deals with different kinds of boycotts, embargos, or
ﬁnancial sanctions imposed on, for instance, Rhodesia and South
Africa (Portela, 2010: 11ff). The complexity of the sanctions
phenomenon is an important part of the reason why scholarly
research contests to what degree the increasing economic
consequences of economic sanctions for the targeted state will
tend to lead to a higher level of efﬁciency of the sanctions (Elliott,
1998; Pape, 1998; Baldwin, 1999/2000). Brieﬂy, the argument is
that, in order to be considered efﬁcient, economic impact will
have to be followed by political decisions of complying with the
sanctions. The targeted regime might have an interest in rejecting
foreign interference in its internal affairs with the ambition of
increasing internal cohesion in a given society—as when faced
with international sanctions the Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini, argued that Iran was pursuing a policy of
a “resistance economy” (Bazoobandi, 2015: 64). This article does
not discuss in detail the unhealthy internal economic environ-
ment in Iran due to long-standing structural challenges or to what
degree the lack of ability to deal with them have added to
convincing the Iranian regime of the necessity of opening up to
the international community.
Later on when targeted sanctions were invented—and some-
times inﬂicted on so-called pariah states—they were obviously
also exposed to scholarly discussion and assessment (Thomas,
2013). As described by Portela (2010: 19), the EU established a
practice of imposing sanctions from the early 1980s, and from the
early 1990s targeted sanctions on behalf of the EU were applied.
In the case of Iran, sanctions were not imposed before the UN
implemented their sanctions, and then a variety of EU sanctions
were imposed consisting of travel bans, arms embargos, freezing
of assets and commodity boycotts (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013). It is
therefore obvious that the analysis is becoming more complex
and that it can be difﬁcult in the given case to determine what
type of sanctions is the more efﬁcient. This article assumes that
the reason why the sanctions imposed on Iran demonstrate a
relatively high degree of efﬁciency can be explained by analysing a
combination of external and internal dimensions of the political
and economic conditions for Iran in the given context. In other
words, this article hypothesizes that (1) the high level of harm
inﬂicted on the Iranian economy by external sanctions con-
tributed to persuading the regime to come to terms with the
sanctions regime; that (2) the speciﬁc role of the EU regarding the
negotiations with and sanctions against Iran and in connection
with that the relatively high degree of international consensus and
cooperation between the sanctioning states added to the efﬁciency
of the sanctioning regime; and that (3) the sanctions played a role
in determining the Iranian ability to pursue its policies in the
Levant and the Gulf security subcomplexes.
International sanctions with a focus on EU measures
International sanctions: The UN and the United States. The
sanctions on Iran are without doubt among the toughest the
world community has imposed on any country within the recent
decades. Since 2010, the sanctions tended to focus in particular on
the nuclear issue, but most sanctions had multiple objectives,
addressing different perceived threats (Katzman, 2015). The UN
sanctions went back to 2006, starting with UNSC Resolution
1696, “noting that … the IAEA is unable to conclude that there
are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran … [and]
expresses its intention … to persuade Iran to comply with this
resolution” (UN, 2006). The following UNSC resolutions, adop-
ted in 2006 and 2007, focused on the nuclear issue as well and
added measures preventing supplies to Iran of nuclear-related
materials and technology. The sanctions aimed at affecting
persons involved in the nuclear program or in the ballistic missile
program (UNSC Resolution 1737) and also included an arms
embargo on Iran (Res. 1747). In 2008, the sanctions involving
freezing of assets were extended, and it was also proposed to
monitor the activities of Iranian banks (Res. 1803). Furthermore,
it was decided to inspect the cargo to and from Iran of aircraft
and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line if, as it said, “reasonable grounds
existed to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting
prohibited goods.” (UN, 2008) Also in 2008, a resolution (1835)
was adopted conﬁrming the four former resolutions. UNSC
Resolution 1929 of 2010 added impetus to these types of sanc-
tions, and with Resolutions 1984, 2049, 2105 and 2159, the
mandate of the panel of experts formed by the UN to monitor the
sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program was extended for
the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Finally, the UNSC adopted
Resolution 2231 of July 2015, which enshrined the JCPOA agreed
upon in Vienna (UN, 2015b).
In connection with the following discussions in the UN, and on
behalf of the US Government, the US Permanent Representative
to the UN, Samantha Power, expressed satisfaction with the
achievements in Vienna, but at the same time emphasized that
the US would “maintain [its] own sanctions related to Iran’s
support for terrorism, its ballistic missiles program and its human
rights violations” (UN, 2015a). The United States has sanctioned
Iran for decades, starting after the Iranian revolution in 1978–
1979, when the United States, as an ofﬁcial response to the
occupation of the US Embassy in Teheran and the hostage taking,
froze Iranian assets. According to Pollack (2004: 164), the
Iranians, in order to deny leverage to the US, were about to start
withdrawing all of their assets from US Banks when US President
Jimmy Carter ordered the freeze of deposits, estimated at around
$12 billion. Furthermore, all trade with Iran was cut off except
exports of humanitarian goods such as food and medicine.
The policy of sanctions later—under US President Bill Clinton—
became a central part of the Dual Containment policy against
Iran and Iraq (Pollack, 2004: 261). The United States increased
the sanctions in the 1980s and also in 1990s, mainly with the
purpose of compelling Iran to give up its support of alleged
terrorist activities and to limit Iranian inﬂuence on the security
subcomplexes of the Middle East (Katzman, 2015: 1). From the
mid-2000s, the United States sanctions focused on pressuring the
Iranians not to change the character of the Iranian nuclear
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program, so that it continued only to deal with civilian use. The
US interests are obviously related both to their own overall
strategic interests, but also to those of their allies and here it is
important to differentiate between Saudi and Israeli interests vis-
à-vis Iran. The Saudi interests focus on potential Iranian inﬂuence
in the Gulf, including the sectarian dimension and the question of
internal stability in Saudi-Arabia and the GCC-states in general.
The Israeli interests deal with Iranian inﬂuence in the Levant and
the potential strategic changes related to possible changes of the
Israeli threat environment (Albright et al., 2014). The sanctions
were stepped up, especially from 2010, to intensify the pressure
on the regime in Teheran. An interesting expression of this could
be seen when in January 2015 the US Senate Banking Committee
attempted to advance a bill threatening additional sanctions in
case the international negotiators should fail to reach a ﬁnal
agreement by mid-2015.
Phases of the EU’s sanctions from negotiated solutions to post-
agreement. The EU sanctions against Iran followed a different
pattern than the US sanctions. The process that led to the Vienna
talks originated in a tripartite initiative by France, Germany and
the United Kingdom, where the three dominant EU countries
succeeded in persuading the Iranians to accept being part of
negotiations taking their point of departure in international
concerns that the Iranian nuclear program might have a military
dimension (Alcaro and Tabrizi, 2014). This followed a relatively
long history of mutual mistrust, in which the EU and Iran had
difﬁculties in reaching common grounds for contacts, let alone
negotiations, but where EU sanctions were “largely limited to
enforcing targeted sanctions imposed by the United Nations from
2006” (Patterson, 2013). In 2009, some individual EU member
states, like France and the United Kingdom, suggested signiﬁcant
economic sanctions against Iran, and this revealed a lack of
consensus within the EU (Patterson, 2013: 135). Added to that, as
described by Michal Onderco, the lack of agreement over time
expressed itself in different patterns. The United Kingdom was
the ﬁrst EU country to argue that sanctions should be adopted for
Iran, when a critical Iran dossier reached the UNSC. France did
not share this view right away. This became a reality after the
election of President Nicolas Sarkozy, while in the meantime
Germany remained isolated in a relatively soft approach, where
they argued that Iran should be allowed speciﬁc limited enrich-
ment activities (Onderco, 2015: 59). Summing up, the policies
related to decisions on sanctioning Iran have been somewhat
incoherent, and it took some time after the establishment of the
EEAS, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, before the EU
was able to enter into negotiations with Iran. It is relevant brieﬂy
to describe the phases leading up to the establishment of the
sanctions regime and the history of the sanctions until the
agreement was reached in 2015.
The EU’s early soft power strategy. In a ﬁrst phase—going back
to before the turn of the century and lasting until the middle
of the following decade, before the start of the UN sanctions
began being implemented and while the United States pursued
the Dual Containment policy—the EU attempted to inﬂuence
the Iranian regime via a soft-power strategy, going for negotiated
solutions. The EU seemed to believe, probably partly as a result
of a relatively positive assessment of the then “reform-President”
Mohammad Khatami, that it would be possible to win over
Iran for talks aiming at diplomatic progress—in the long run
“bringing civilizations together”, as was the narrative of the
speeches given by the Iranian President among others in Paris
and Rome in 1999 (Mirbagheri, 2007). A dimension of the soft
power strategy was local cooperation by EU diplomats with
representatives from Iran or from its “allies”, for instance
Hezbollah in Lebanon.2
Initially the so-called E3—France, Germany and the United
Kingdom—took the lead on behalf of the EU. They brought
forward incentives related to civilian use of nuclear power for
Iran, for instance by offering technical support. They also offered
to strengthen commercial ties between the EU and Iran, including
in the energy sector and also to work for Iran’s accession to the
WTO (Kienzle, 2012). The EU presented an early breakthrough
in the negotiations when in 2004 it succeeded in landing the Paris
Agreement, where Iran “consented to freeze enrichment and to
sign the IAEA Additional Protocol in exchange for trade and
technology beneﬁts from the EU.” (Portela, 2015) It didn’t take
long, however, before the positive tendencies were reversed.
New Iranian leadership and the EU response. With the election of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in 2005 Iranian
policies changed, starting with the announcement that they would
start enriching uranium at 20 percent. The differences between
two presidents, as remarkable as they may be, do not explain
everything, but it seems reasonable to speak of a second phase in
European–Iranian relations lasting from 2006 to 2010. The period
started with the newly appointed President Ahmadinejad
announcing that Iran would start enriching its plutonium and
ended with doing exactly that, thus presenting the international
community with a new reality. This convinced the EU to impose
additional sanctions to the ones already adopted from 2006
following the UNSC sanctions.
Five years later, this was actually being carried out, which made
the EU move closer to the United States in its policies toward Iran
(Portela, 2015: 190–191). Things also changed at the negotiating
table, where the non-European members of the UNSC, the
United States, Russia and China, accepted being represented by
the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.
This model for negotiations presented an indirect conﬂict of
interest. On one side, the pressure on Iran became stronger
through the more massive leverage provided by the consensus
among the European and non-European permanent members of
the UNSC. However, on the other side, the different conditions
for the EU and the United States in their strategic position
vis-à-vis Iran were able to lead to a weakening of the alliance
against Iran. One example is the oil issue, where the United States
—in contrast to the EU—had no problem with imposing an oil
embargo on Iran (Van de Graaf 2013). Furthermore the new
situation tended to reopen divisions among the EU member states
(Patterson, 2013). According to Patterson, of the “anti-sanctions
camp” countries within the EU, consisting of Greece, Cyprus,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, all except for Sweden would
be hit by an oil embargo against Iran (Patterson, 2013: 142).
EU adopts “autonomous” sanctions. From 2010, as analysed by Erica
Moret, the EU, which formerly had been “reluctant to align EU
policy on Iran with the stance of the US government whose
sanctions against the country are particularly extensive”, (Moret,
2015) changed its policies and sharpened the sanctions in a third
phase, where so-called “autonomous” sanctions were adopted by
the EU (Bazoobandi, 2015). The homepage of the EEAS
presented a 140-page-long list of the 35 states under sanctions
by the EU and the restrictive measures being enforced against
them. The list showing the sanctions against Iran was 17 pages
long and described a signiﬁcant number of sanctions, all of which
were the result of EU Council Decisions from 2010 to 2015
(EEAS, 2015). The sanctions represented a broad spectrum of
measures with a focus on violation of human rights, different
types of embargos, restrictions related to speciﬁc types of
production (for instance oil or gas production), or related to
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the nuclear issue. The individual sanctions entailed restrictive
measures, as in Council Decision 235 of 14 April 2011, where a
speciﬁc person, the ﬁrst one mentioned being Chief of Iran’s
National Police Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, was allegedly
responsible for the fact that “Forces under his command led
brutal attacks on peaceful protests, and a violent night time attack
on the dormitories of Tehran University on 15 June 2009.”
(EEAS, 2015: 32) The actual sanction entailed a travel ban which
involved all EU member states and the freezing of economic
resources belonging to the given person.
Applying the oil embargo. A fourth phase might be identiﬁed from
2012, when the oil embargo was implemented. From that time the
Iranian economy was more seriously affected by the international
sanctions, as demonstrated by Peter Bergeijk (Bergeijk, 2015).
In the case of embargos, certain commodities of importance for
the Iranian regime were exposed to restrictions. For instance,
regarding equipment relevant for telecommunications, Council
Decision 168 of 24 March 2012 speciﬁed a restriction on: “The
sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment or software intended
primarily for use in the monitoring or interception by the Iranian
regime … [and] equipment which might be used for internal
repression to Iran”. In some cases, besides the general embargo,
this involved targeted persons who might be directly involved
in the use of the mentioned type of equipment for the purpose
resulting in the sanction (EEAS, 2015). The same doubling
applied to the restrictions related to speciﬁc types of production
of strategic signiﬁcance, where the sanctions were intended
to inﬂuence the given type of production and the persons
(owners, leading employees) responsible. Some of the most
comprehensive sets of sanction were those related to the nuclear
issue. Council Decision 413 of 27 July 2010 and Council
Regulation 267 of 24 February 2012 represented this category.
Regulation 267 made it clear that sanctions were imposed in
relation to “other goods and technology which could contribute
to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water-related
activities, to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
or to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed
concerns” (EEAS, 2015).
The post-agreement phase. It can be argued that 2015 saw the
beginning of a ﬁfth phase, which could be termed a post-
agreement phase. According to the JCPOA of 14 July 2015, a
timeframe was agreed upon by the following partners: China,
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom,
the United States and Iran—with the goal that “The full
implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme” and that “Iran
reafﬁrms that under no circumstance will Iran ever seek, develop
or acquire any nuclear weapons.” (JCPOA, 2015) In addition to
this general statement, a number of detailed provisions were
brought forward in the document, listing 17 demands which Iran
should live up to when dealing with nuclear issues: enrichment,
stockpiles and so on.3 On the other side, the sanctioning states
promised to change or terminate sanctions imposed on Iran.
Furthermore, the document contained an implementation plan,
which described how the above-mentioned details should be
implemented over the days, weeks and years following the
conclusion of the agreement until—ideally speaking—the
agreement was fulﬁlled on both sides of the negotiating table.
The Levant and the Gulf security subcomplexes, and
European–Iranian relations
It is the ofﬁcial Iranian position that it never had plans of
exploiting its nuclear resources for military purposes.
Nevertheless the potential threat of Iran being in possession of
nuclear weapons was a source of grave concern in both the Levant
and the Gulf (Ehteshami et al., 2013). Not least Israel—and in
particular the Israeli media—fearing that Iran might intend to use
atomic weapons for the purpose of removing the Jewish state
from the surface of the earth, argued against Iran being allowed to
develop their nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu claimed that Iran was a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” and
that any deal with Iran would be a historical mistake (Juneau,
2014: 102). Iran, on its part, attempted to become “champion of
the Palestinian cause” and sought to encircle Israel through its
connections with Syria, Hezbollah and different Palestinian
rejectionist groups, in particular Hamas (Juneau, 2014: 98).
At the same time, Iran was challenged by what might be
considered as the hegemonic power on the Arab side of the Gulf,
Saudi Arabia, which at least regarding economic strength gained
from the relative weakening of Iran following the pressure over
the last years from the international sanctions, and in particular
as a result of the oil embargoes.
Since the Iran–Iraq war brought Iran and Syria together in
opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, there have been close
relations between the two states. The Iranian strategic goal of
ﬁghting Israel was shared by Syria, and with strong non-state
actors as allies, the goal was pursued by both states. The war in
Syria from 2011 tended to weaken the alliance, as the regime in
Damascus appeared more and more isolated in the Arab region,
supported only wholeheartedly by Hezbollah (Seeberg, 2015).
Potentially, the nuclear agreement with Iran of July 2015 might
result in a relative weakening of its links to Syria and the
Hezbollah, but obviously this seems somewhat speculative.
Clearly Hezbollah plays a role in the complex relations between
Iran and the West, and the EU has traditionally had major
difﬁculties in dealing with this particular role of Hezbollah
(Seeberg, 2009). The EU—knowing the strength of Hezbollah in
Lebanon—indirectly attempted to reduce its inﬂuence. In July
2013, the EU’s foreign ministers agreed to put the armed wing of
Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations (EurActiv, 2013).
This was ofﬁcially because of an alleged involvement of Hezbollah
in a terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria, but there is hardly any
doubt that the direct military involvement of the Shiite group in
Syria, in support of President Bashar al-Assad, shifted the opinion
of several EU politicians.4 At the same time, however, it was made
clear that the EU would maintain contact with the Hezbollah
party, being part of Lebanon’s parliament and also an important
part of the complicated ethnic-religious realities in Lebanon, with
which the EU wanted to stay in contact (Fakhoury, 2014).
Traditionally the United States–Saudi cooperation has been a
continuous obstacle for Iran’s foreign policy opportunities
(Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013). On the other side, the tight
connection between Washington and Riyadh has also been a
useful phenomenon for the rhetoric of Iranian outbursts against
the Saudis. The discussion in the United States underlines the
close alliance between the United States and the GCC states, and
only few subscribe to the argument by Waltz (2012)—building on
a balance of power logic—that the world could live with Iranian
nuclear weapons. Regarding the negotiations leading toward
Vienna, Saudi Arabia ofﬁcially supported them, but in reality the
Saudis were highly sceptical about progress in the negotiations.
Saudi Arabia feared that a deal might result in a situation where
Iran can “maintain a residual nuclear program” (Juneau, 2014:
102). Furthermore, the GCC states fear that the recent balance—
due to their massive investments in advanced weapon systems,
which Iran cannot match—might be outweighed by Iran’s latent
nuclear capability, which even in the long run could mean an
Iranian nuclear weapon. The United States is obviously not
interested in a such a scenario, but has at the same time an
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interest in levelling the rhetoric when it comes to the relation
between the United States, its Arab partners and Iran—as
expressed in this statement by Barack Obama: “America has to
listen to our Sunni Arab allies, but also not fall into the trap of
letting them blame every problem on Iran. The citizens of more
than a few Arab Gulf states have been big contributors to Sunni
jihadist movements that have been equally destabilizing”
(Friedman, 2015).
Part of the complexity of the interplay between the regional
and international actors has to do with paradoxical commonal-
ities of interests between Iran and the United States in a weakened
Iraq. The US-led invasions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 indirectly
strengthened Iran, simply because the Iranians were able to focus
less on the security challenges from Iraq and more on the
possibilities for advancing Iranian interests in the Levant and the
Gulf without being afraid of the rivalry from Iraq. Added to that,
the regional security subcomplexes in which Iran is a signiﬁcant
actor are characterized by other forms of interconnectedness,
namely in the sense that the development in the Middle East since
2011 with the Arab uprisings led to a restructuring of some state-
to-state relations and also to changes within Arab organizations.
Attempts from the side of the GCC states to include Jordan (and
Morocco) in the GCC “community” can be interpreted as an
attempt to stabilize the Levant subcomplex (Helfont and Tally,
2012), suffering from the chaotic situation in Syria, and the threat
from emerging IS. It can also be seen as an investment in
partners, which can contribute to strengthening the GCC states in
their strategic challenges from Iran—both in the Gulf and, via
Syria and Hezbollah, in the Levant. As already mentioned, Israel
is another actor that establishes a connection between the two
subcomplexes, resulting from its tight connections to the United
States, its explicit criticism of the Vienna agreement, and
challenges from Hezbollah in Lebanon, strongly supported
by Iran.
Summing up, the transition since 2011 resulted in a shifting
strategic landscape in the Middle East. The European response to
the Iranian nuclear proliferation crisis was probably one of the
foreign policy areas within which the EU was able to function as a
relatively cohesive actor (Portela and Ruffa, 2015). As shown
above, this does not mean that the cooperation within the EU was
without disagreement, and it should also be mentioned that in
connection with some issues reluctance on the part of the EU as a
whole could be identiﬁed. In other words, as formulated by
Alcaro and Tabrizi (2014: 14): “While the Europeans can be
credited with some unquestionable achievements, the dispute has
also laid bare the limits of European foreign policy”.
The limits can be described in different ways related to the EU
foreign and security policy interests, primarily focusing on four
areas. First: Regarding the economic dimension, the EU had been
an important trading partner for decades and obviously there was
an interest in protecting and—if possible—expanding the trade
relations between Iran and the EU. Second, it was important to
continue the non-proliferation regime related to Iran’s nuclear
program. Third, the European interests focused on keeping an eye
on the Iranian inﬂuence in the Levant, initially in relation to
Lebanon, and later on related to the Syrian crisis from 2011 and
onwards. Fourth, the EU had a strategic interest in (contributing
to) preventing the rivalries in the Gulf between the GCC states
and Iran from escalating. To a certain extent the EU had the
necessary tools for pursuing the ﬁrst two foreign policy goals.
Given an internal consensus in applying economic instruments,
the EU would be able to affect the Iranian economy. In 2011, as
shown by Francesco Giumelli and Paul Ivan, as the EU accounted
for almost one third of Iran’s export and around 23 percent of its
oil export, this meant that together the EU countries were Iran’s
largest trading partner (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013: 17). Also the EU
was able to play a role as part of the control measures built
around the Iranian nuclear program. The steps taken by the EU
turned out to be efﬁcient in the sense that in 2008 its status as
most signiﬁcant trading partner was exchanged in 2012 for a
position as number four (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013: 17). The years
after 2012 saw European trade with Iran drop even further
(Bergeijk, 2015: 50), and this reality appeared without causing any
signiﬁcant split between the EU member states. Regarding the
third and fourth EU foreign policy interests, the EU lacked
the necessary means to pursue the goals. In the Gulf in particular,
the EU would have to rely on some kind of US interference,
especially when it came to the military dimensions of the strategic
relations.
In the Levant, Iran’s alliance with Syria and Hezbollah has been
a source of inﬂuence for the regime in Teheran. Nevertheless it
would seem likely that the Iranians consider the recent situation
in Syria to be an obstacle for improving its relations with the
international community. Obviously the Iranian decision to
support the Syrian regime as the internal conﬂict escalated has
not been without costs. However, despite the economic reasons
for resisting a permanent involvement in the Syrian crisis, as
argued by Terrill (2015: 223), “Iran’s leadership has remained
committed to President Bashar al-Asad’s survival due to political
and strategic concerns”. Beyond the traditional “revolutionary
solidarity” between Iran and Syria, these concerns are related to
the new signiﬁcant non-state actors in the Levant, namely the
al-Qa‘ida-afﬁliated Jahbat al-Nusra and the IS. It is obviously not
in the interest of the Iranians to allow a replacement of the
Teheran-loyal Ba’athist regime in Damascus with powerful and
unpredictable radical movements like IS, ﬁghting for a Sunni-
based Caliphate. The emergence of IS on the political-military
scene in the Levant has added another commonality of interest to
the already existing alliance between Iran and Syria, thereby
linking the Levant security subcomplex together with the Gulf
subcomplex. An additional point is the paradoxical commonality
of interest between Iran, Syria, and the EU as a result of the
entrance of IS into the conﬂict patterns of the Levant. In this
context, Iran can offer to use its inﬂuence in the Levant, via Syria
and Hezbollah, as an asset in negotiations with international
actors in the UNSC. By indirectly supporting the international
coalition against IS, which includes international actors as well as
Arab states, Iran can gain advantages. And, as things have
developed in the Levant, the coalition against IS probably prefers
not to attempt to remove Assad and thus tends to have fewer
objections to Iran’s Syria policies than might have been the case a
few years ago (Terrill, 2015: 236).
Regarding Iranian–European relations in the Gulf, it is a fact
that the EU has limited strategic inﬂuence there. The most
signiﬁcant EU inﬂuence in the Gulf derives from the economic
relations with the GCC states, with which the EU maintains trade
and investment cooperation. The ﬁnancial crisis since 2008–9
has to some degree prevented dynamic cooperation between the
Arab Gulf states and the EU, which according to Valentina
Kostadinova was expected, from materializing. Still a relatively
comprehensive and growing economic exchange is taking place
between the EU and the rich Gulf states (Kostadinova, 2013). Iran
would like to be part of this trade and investment cooperation,
but for years this has been impossible. Obviously a commonality
of interests exists within this ﬁeld. Iran has attempted to replace
the Western international actors by establishing economic ties
with China, India, Russia and so on, but the strategic interests in
being continuously able to import goods and advanced
technological equipment from the EU (and the United States)
are obviously recognized in Iran. Furthermore bilateral trade
agreements with other trading partners have been very difﬁcult to
maintain, since the possible partners to the East have also been
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enrolled into the international sanctions against the Iranian
nuclear program.
Conclusion
The mutual interest of the EU and Iran in re-establishing trade
relations will probably turn out to be a signiﬁcant factor for their
future cooperation. Beyond the US sanctions this will probably
also be the case for US–Iranian trade relations. It seems realistic
that a lifting of the oil embargo could play an important role in
this context (Tichý and Odintsov, 2016). The rivalry between
Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf makes the issue relevant
because a very large part of the low-cost production and export
of oil and natural gas in the world potentially takes place in the
GCC states, Iran, and Iraq (Miller et al., 2015: 12).5 Speciﬁcally
regarding the Arab–Iranian relations it is a highly complex ﬁeld,
and the GCC states do not necessarily have identical interests.
Some of the small GCC states might have a long-term interest in
cooperating with the Iranians, whereas Saudi Arabia, which
already has a deep mistrust of Iran, mainly sees it as a (potentially
strong) competitor (Miller et al., 2015: 13).
The Iranian response to the sanctions was very bitter, and,
exposed to the relatively high level of international consensus
in sanctioning Iran, the Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamenei
held speeches referring to international interference in Iranian
internal affairs; the speeches containing rhetorical outbursts in
which he claimed that if you “show ﬂexibility, arrogant powers
will make their threat more serious” (Maloney, 2015: 480). In the
coming years, there will be an obvious (and highly interesting)
research task related to following a possible rapprochement
between Iran and the international sanctioning powers and, as
stated by Iana Dreyer, “the degree to which Tehran will abide by
the terms of the July 2015 JCPOA will also be crucially inﬂuenced
by the sanctioning actors’ own credibility in rewarding Iranian
compliance with concomitant sanctions relief” (Dreyer et al.,
2015: 78). As expected there will be some differences between the
EU and the United States in this respect, as a result of the
differences in the sanctioning practices both before and after
the JCPOA.
It is therefore relevant initially to discuss what lessons can be
learned from the period in which the sanctions was imposed.
Sanctions are sometimes employed even though their efﬁciency in
the given case might not be evident, simply because the use of
force comes at too high a price. Obviously Iran is and has been a
difﬁcult opponent to deal with for the international community.
As argued by Oskarsson (2012: 98), Iran is a good example of a
state where the regime has been able to get around the sanctions
and still stay in power. The regime has also been able to
manoeuvre for some time to avoid a united front of sanctioning
powers, but as the international consensus on sanctioning Iran
grew stronger, it decided to accept the conditions imposed by the
international sanctioning powers. Iran’s foreign policy represents,
both before and after the decision of complying with the
sanctions regime, an interesting example of “recombinant
authoritarianism” and in connection with that the EU played a
signiﬁcant role in maintaining the international sanctions
“coalition” (Portela, 2015). The Iranian moderation can have
important consequences for its population, as analysed by
Mohseni: a de-securitization of Iran’s international nuclear ﬁle
will potentially have signiﬁcant domestic implications—in
particular if it is combined with a successful Western strategy
of reintegrating Iran in the global economy (Mohseni et al.,
2015: 14)
It seems meaningful to claim that the sanctions inﬂuenced the
Iranians’ decisions on the nuclear issue, leading to the situation
where President Hassan Rouhani, representing the Iranian state,
accepted the conditions of the JCPOA, thereby laying the
foundation for Iran emerging from its “strategic loneliness,” as
coined by Thomas Juneau. This article has argued that the EU’s
role as negotiator and mediator, its adoption of the UNSC
sanctions, and its own sanctions together point to the conclusion,
that the EU (together with the United States) should be
considered a signiﬁcant player in the development leading to
the ﬁnal agreement in Vienna. For almost two decades, the
relationship between Iran and the EU was inﬂuenced by the issues
related to the Iranian nuclear program. The phases identiﬁed in
the article underline the development of the speciﬁc role of the
EU—also in the construction of the international sanctions
regime, which at last seemed to convince Iran to accept the
conditions offered in connection with the negotiations. The EU,
as argued by Morillas (2015), might be on its way to developing
into an important foreign policy mediator. However, if this is to
be realized in a wider perspective, the EU will have to become
better at bringing politics and policies together, meaning
“the interplay between the EU’s capacity to act as an external
mediator and the conditionality of its policies” (Morillas, 2015:
33). In the case of Iran the EU’s abilities at bringing these
dimensions together do, despite a lack of consensus among its
member states concerning the sanctions, seem to be somewhat
improved.
The analysis of Iran’s role in the Levant and the Gulf security
subcomplexes indicated that Iran for decades was a relatively
strong actor in both environments and that the sanctions only to
some extent were important in determining the limits for Iranian
policies there. In the Levant, Iran was pursuing its foreign policy
goals via its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah (and to a lesser
degree Hamas), whereas in the Gulf, Iran had to be more self-
reliant. Economic constraints set limits for Iranian actions, as did
the actions by the international sanctioning states and their
alliances in the Middle East. But in the last years things tended to
change, as demonstrated in several ways. When in the Levant
context the EU, for instance, put the military wing of Hezbollah
on its terror list, this only to a limited degree had any relation to
the sanctions issue, but still indirectly played a role for the
negotiating strength of Iran. The arms embargo and the economic
effects of the sanctions over time weakened Iran vis-à-vis the Arab
Gulf states, which, as part of the ongoing Gulf rivalry, purchased
signiﬁcant amounts of sophisticated weapons.
Summing up in regard to the hypothesis brought forward in
the analytical framework section, it seems that the sanctions
actually contributed to making Iran change its policies and agree
to the JCPOA, thereby—as mentioned—practicing recombinant
authoritarianism. In addition to that the EU was successful in
bringing together a strong coalition of international powers
behind the demands raised at the negotiating table. And
furthermore: in general the sanctions weakened the position of
Iran within the two regional security subcomplexes, in which it
sought (and seeks) inﬂuence, in particular in the Gulf. Regarding
the Levant subcomplex things are more complicated. As shown
the historical dimension is important for the understanding of the
complex developments of the EU–Iran relations, especially when
it comes to the question of Syria. As pointed out the Iranians
probably considered the emerging crisis in Syria in the ﬁrst years
after 2011 and Iran’s support for the Syrian regime as constituting
an obstacle for improving their relations with the EU. However,
the arrival of the IS on the political and military scene of the IS
added to the complexity and ambiguity. The EU and Iran have, as
mentioned, common interests in controlling and rolling back the
IS. In connection with that the Iranian decision, beyond the
agreement on the JCPOA, to continue its support for the regime
in Damascus might not be that important anymore, as seen from
Brussels.
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Notes
1 The author is grateful for the inspiration from talks and publications, which came out
of meetings arranged by the EUISS Taskforce in 2015, focusing on EU sanctions on
Iran, Russia and Syria. See Dreyer et al.: On target? EU sanctions as security policy
tools (Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera, 2015).
2 This is based on interview by the author with Patrick Renaud, former Head of the
European Union Delegation in Lebanon and Amman.
3 For a thorough presentation and analysis of the nuclear deal, see Gary Samore et al.
(2015) The Iran Nuclear Deal. A Deﬁnitive Guide, The Iran Project. Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
4 Interview by the author with anonymous Middle East EU-delegates.
5 By low-cost production is meant traditional production of oil and gas—in contrast to,
for instance, shale oil extraction and other expensive types of oil and gas production.
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